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INTERNALIZATION
THROUGH SOCIALIZATION
HAROLD HONGJU KOH†
Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have authored an
important paper and have begun an important project: how the
process of internalization of international law into national behavior
transpires through the process of “socialization.” That project
continues their important joint work on the Institutional Theory of
1
Sovereignty by sketching an ambitious outline of an integrated model
of social mechanisms that influence state behavior. In this comment,
let me explain first, why the project and this paper are important; and
second, how their project could be strengthened in the years ahead.
Until quite recently, the enterprise of International Legal
Scholarship had long been viewed as a complex oxymoron: like the
“Holy Roman Empire,” which, of course, was neither Holy, Roman,
nor an Empire, or the “New York Giants,” who are neither New,
from New York, or Giants. Similarly, many domestic lawyers had
assumed that if the subject was “international,” there could be no law
involved, and if the subject was “international law,” there could be no
scholarship involved.
All that changed less than two decades ago, when international
2
law finally met international relations theory. Unlike many other
areas of legal scholarship, international law was a relative latecomer
to interdisciplinarity; the field only became interdisciplinary about
fifteen years ago, not coincidentally about the time that the collapse
of the Berlin Wall signaled the new functionality of international law
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1. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2003) (proposing “a sociological model of sovereignty” stemming
from their “systematic reexamination” of the “questionable empirical assumptions about the
nature of the state and its relation to the international order”).
2. For a review of the evolution of this collaboration, see generally FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2004).
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rules. As Goodman and Jinks’s article recognizes, the first generation
of interdisciplinary international law/international relations work
predictably adopted political science as the “other discipline,”
invoking rational choice theory as the exemplar of what constitutes
political science. But over time, that interdisciplinary dialogue shifted.
A whole range of international relations theories, drawn primarily
from the schools of political science and political economy, were
imported into the essentially doctrinal, “old legal process” approach
of international legal scholarship.3 The main challenge to rationalist
thought during this period came from the constructivist, “ideational”
school of international relations theory, typified by the work of such
constructivist political science scholars as Professors John Gerard
4
Ruggie, Alexander Wendt, Kathryn Sikkink, and Martha Finnemore.
The lead dialectic arose between “interest-based theories”—those
theories that take state interests as givens—and “idea-based”
theories—those theories that take state interests as constructed
socially through the influence of ideas. This dialectic led to the nowfamiliar, but increasingly tired, dichotomy between realists and
constructivists, with the former group tending to believe that
international law promotes compliance primarily by relying on
techniques of coercion and the latter group suggesting that
compliance grows more fundamentally from techniques of persuasion
resting on the power of norms.5
Goodman and Jinks’s paper takes this first-generation scholarship
as a given, and moves deeper, thus constituting a leading example of
what may now be fairly called “Second-Generation” International
Law/International Relations scholarship. Goodman and Jinks’s

3. For a compressed intellectual history, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 186–94 (1996) (comparing the history of domestic legal process
scholarship with international legal process scholarship).
4. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1996); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); ALEXANDER E. WENDT, SOCIAL
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 391 (2001); John
Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992).
5. For elaboration of the history of this debate, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2615–34 (1997).
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approach gets past the question usually asked by first-generation
international law and international relations scholars—namely, “Does
international law matter?”—and instead brings the microscope into
sharper focus, asking, “Given that international law matters, what are
the social mechanisms that help make international law matter?”
Goodman and Jinks then recognize that the mechanics of social
influence have so far been grossly underspecified in the literature. In
their view, we must start studying not just the macroprocesses, but
also the social mechanisms that actually govern the social influence of
law, i.e., the microprocesses of social influence that affect what I have
elsewhere called “norm-internalization.”6 In short, their piece is a
case study in internalization through socialization.
By refocusing the inquiry, Goodman and Jinks bring a new
dimension to the study of the anatomy of social influence:
identification of “patterns of acculturation.”7 Their article usefully
makes clear that chosen social mechanisms are distinct from
methodological orientations. Some constructivists emphasize
coercion; some rationalists emphasize persuasion. Thus, the
traditional coercion-persuasion dichotomy invoked by both realists
and constructivists really masks a trichotomy that includes a third
way—patterns of acculturation, or societal pressures upon a state to
assimilate with a higher normative standard.
By focusing on acculturation over coercion and persuasion,
Goodman and Jinks place themselves squarely in the constructivist
camp, talking about how preferences form and change through a
complex interaction between process and ideas. As significantly, their
study of social mechanisms requires the importation of a new
discipline—not political science and international relations, which
have traditionally been the social sciences applied to international
legal studies—but Law and Sociology, a field in which both of these
scholars have advanced degrees. Their work thus imports into
interdisciplinary work in international relations a new literature that
has not previously been much read or invoked by international law
scholars, namely the New Institutional Theory of organizations,
pioneered by such sociology scholars as Professors Paul DiMaggio,
Woody Powell, John Meyer, and Lynne Zucker.8

6. Id. at 2646.
7. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004).
8. See generally sources cited in Goodman & Jinks, id. at 626–27 n.9.
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Goodman and Jinks’s law-and-sociology approach leads them to
the broader notion of world policy institutionalism described in their
Stanford Law Review paper, a theory rooted in the sociology of
organizations. That theory asks why nation-states end up identifying
with a referent group and trying to keep up with a community
standard in global affairs.9 Their sustained examination of this
question leads them toward an as-yet underdeveloped, but potentially
promising, sociological model of state sovereignty, which sees the
state not as a monolith, but as an institutionalized organizational form
embedded in global cultural order. Thus, the approach sees the
globalization of human rights as an aspect of the broader
globalization of culture and language, which, as much as particular
ideas, has the potential to define and redefine the legitimate purposes
of the nation-state.
In one sense, Goodman and Jinks’s approach is not new. Their
broader world polity model has close familial ties to the English
10
“international society” school of Grotian heritage. Like the
American constructivists, the British “international society” scholars
see the norms, values, and social structure of international society as
helping to form the identity of, and then to acculturate the national
actors who operate within, that international society. Nations thus
obey international rules not just because of sophisticated calculations
about how compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests,
but because a repeated habit of obedience within a societal setting
socializes them and remakes their interests so that they come to value

9. Goodman & Jinks, supra n. 1.
10. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 13, 28–33 (1977):
[I]f states today form an international society . . . this is because, recognising certain
common interests and perhaps common values, they regard themselves as bound by
certain rules in their dealings with one another . . . . [and] co-operate in the working
of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of
diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions
of war.
For other writings in this vein, see generally ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1992); MARTIN WIGHT, Collected Lectures of Martin Wight on
International Theory at the London School of Economics, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE
THREE TRADITIONS (Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter eds., 1992); Barry Buzan, From
International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the
English School, 47 INT’L ORG. 327 (1993); Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study
of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49
(Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); James Mayall, International Society and International Theory, in
THE REASON OF STATES: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY 122 (Michael
Donelan ed., 1978).
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rule compliance. In Andrew Hurrell’s words, “[A] good deal of the
compliance pull of international rules derives from the relationship
between individual rules and the broader pattern of international
relations: states follow specific rules, even when inconvenient,
because they have a longer-term interest in the maintenance of lawimpregnated international community.”11
Nevertheless, the Goodman and Jinks approach charts several
new directions beyond their distinctive choice of a sociological
methodology. First, although this particular paper is not empirical,
their argument can be tested as part of an emerging wave of empirical
scholarship in international law and international relations.12 Second,
they focus not on the traditional subject matter of international
law/international relations—international trade—but, rather, on the
more thorny topic of human rights. Human rights has traditionally
been the toughest case study for interdisciplinary theory because
compliance with international human rights rules cannot easily be
explained as reciprocity or by reference to a larger cooperation or
coordination game. Moreover, human rights is the subject matter area
in international affairs where the largest enforcement deficit exists,
inasmuch as the costs of enforcement appear high and the benefits
seem low by traditional state interest calculations. Third and finally,
Goodman and Jinks start an important process of looking not just at
channels of influence, but at broader questions of regime design13—
membership, rule precision, and enforcement and monitoring
mechanisms. They suggest that if acculturation and not coercion is the
main approach to social influence, then “hard” mechanisms of social
influence are not necessarily more effective in securing compliance
than softer norms.
If these are the virtues of the emerging Goodman-Jinks project, in
what ways can their project be strengthened? First, they need to test
their approach against many more contemporary concrete examples,
not just historical examples of the kind usefully suggested by José

11. Hurrell, supra note 10, at 59.
12. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003) (critiquing Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make
a Difference?, infra); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (presenting the results of empirical research on the effectiveness of
human rights treaties); Oona A. Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L.
185 (2003).
13. Such scholars as Oona Hathaway, Andrew Guzman, and Kal Raustiala have begun
looking into regime design questions as well.
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Alvarez. For example, they could study the success of their theory of
state socialization along a spectrum of states: from North Korea, to
Libya, to China, to Turkey, to the post-September 11 United States.
Each of these countries presents a differing level of community
participation and a differing degree of issue linkage, in some cases
contractual, in other cases community-based. Instead of treating all
nation-states as standing at a comparable stage of national evolution,
the Goodman-Jinks model should distinguish among different
national agendas for global legitimation through human rights
compliance. North Korea is a prime example of an extraordinarily
isolated country that barely participates in the international
community. To the extent that it can be socialized, this socialization
must begin through quid-pro-quo contractual issue linkages—for
example, the trading of food and energy for reduction of nuclear
production and specific human rights improvements. A country such
as Libya presents a developing example of a previously isolated
country that the United States is now seeking to socialize into
international norms through a broad array of emerging issue linkages.
By contrast, countries such as China and Turkey, each of which
exhibit serious human rights abuses, also display increasing degrees of
community participation. Turkey, for example, must comply with
European human rights norms as a condition of joining the regional
economic community, and China is entering the global economic
community—symbolized by membership in the World Trade
Organization—without yet having acceded fully to the global human
rights agenda. Thus, these different states seek socialization and
legitimation for different reasons: North Korea, in an effort to
eliminate its pariah status; Turkey and China, in an effort to promote
community acceptance; and the United States, out of a desire to
promote a broader global leadership agenda.15
What Goodman and Jinks should clarify is that, at base, their
third way—acculturation—is really an intermediate way between
coercion and persuasion—a form of incomplete internalization that
results from incomplete persuasion. Anyone who parents a teenage
child quickly learns that between norm acceptance and norm

14. José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961 (2005).
15. For a discussion of the different incentives of North Korea, Iraq, and the United States
within the global human rights system, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337 (2004);
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003).
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compliance is a large zone that can be thought of a zone of “norm
conformity.” In any close-knit community there are intense, internally
felt pressures to conform and thereby to reduce a community
member’s discomfort level at being a visible outlier. In this zone, the
motives for conformity are complex. A form of “human rights
covering” occurs, in which countries and leaders accede to the
pressures to acculturate out of a combination of norm acceptance,
conformity, and self-interest. For example, the recent debacle of U.S.
torture at Abu Ghraib triggered a range of American responses that
combined to create a national incentive to conform. But those
responses were themselves varied, ranging from those who were
morally offended by the acts, to those who were disturbed by the
harm to America’s international reputation, to those who were more
outraged by the outrage against Abu Ghraib than by Abu Ghraib
itself. In moving toward an integrated, mutually reinforcing model of
social mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks would do well to introduce
more dynamic elements, tracking the evolution of a state’s norminternalization from coercion to persuasion to internal acceptance.
These are not distinct alternatives, but rather, stages in an
evolutionary process, whereby persuasion often occurs in the shadow
of coercion, and acculturation often occurs in the shadow of
persuasion.
In this evolutionary process, moments of political transition are
important in ways that Goodman and Jinks do not fully address.
Countries that have converted to human rights acceptance tend to be
“more Catholic than the pope,” as illustrated, for example, by the role
of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Vaclav Havel in the Czech
Republic, and Kim Dae Jung in South Korea.
Goodman and Jinks also have yet to develop the details of their
discussion of domestic channels of influence, explaining, for example,
how a society can move from a textual internalization of international
norms (for example, in the U.S.-occupation-influenced Iraqi
constitution) to “internalization on the ground,” in the sense of
genuine social acceptance of human rights norms (what I call
16
elsewhere the process of “social internalization”). Their model also
unduly emphasizes positive treaty law over unwritten customary law
and makes insufficient use of the notion of an “interpretive
16. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) (describing the difference between legal, social, and
political internalization).
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community,” in which the meaning of global norms can be debated
and refined through the interaction of external and internal
17
interpreters.
Still, their paper is important and their long-term project is only
beginning. In a brief time, the collaboration between these two
energetic and talented young scholars has been both productive and
stimulating. This promising start bodes well for their contribution
together in the years to come.18

17. Id. at 649–51 (discussing the concept of interpretive community).
18. See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra notes 1, 7, & 12; Ryan Goodman & Derek P.
Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).

